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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation 
and Policy at the International Hellenic University.  
Due to the recent discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern 
Mediterranean I often have thought what oil companies actually do to explore and 
produce hydrocarbons and I wanted to figure out how these operations are regulated. 
Therefore, the focus of the dissertation is on the various standard types of contracts 
used in the upstream oil industry and its primary aim is to introduce this energy sector 
and become a practical guide to anyone who is interested presenting in a 
comprehensible manner the legal and operational aspects of the upstream activities. 
My concern was to include the more essential information I could in order to provide a 
solid understanding of the mechanisms used to safeguard the relationships between 
the state which opens its upstream oil industry and the International Oil Company.   
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Theodore 
Panagos for sharing his energy expertise. His valuable suggestions, assistance and 
contributions were very helpful during the development of this dissertation. 
Also, I wish to express my gratitude and love to my father, my wife and my 
daughter for their valuable and constant support. 
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Preface 
Oil will continue to be an essential element of states’ energy mix and a key 
driver of the world economy for the foreseeabe future. Explorations of new fields and 
production of oil are condidered activities of vital importance for the energy sector. 
The dissertation stresses the legal context and contractual regime under which the 
upstream activities operate.  
Therefore, the dissertation starts with basic issues which underpin the said 
activities and carries on with issues that contribute to a practical consideration of the 
sector. It includes sections covering the procedures of awarding the rights for 
exploration and production of oil, the types of contracts and the most common terms 
used in the upstream industry, the use of stabilisation clauses in the contracts, 
consideration of the notion of lex petrolea, the EC Hydrocarbon Directive and its 
provisions in relation to awarding exploration and production rights, the licensing 
regime of three selected countries (Greece, United Kingdom and France) and the way 
health, safety and environmental issues are being dealt.         
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Introduction 
The phrase “Petroleum is as necessary to the economy, as blood to the human 
body1” demonstrates that oil is a strategic commodity which dominates the economy 
and involves tremendous wealth and power. Oil is likely to continue to be a key driver 
of the world economy for the foreseeable future, due to the long-term growth in 
economies, especially in China and India, and the increasing demand for oil in the 
transport sector, power generation and other industrial uses2. Undoubtedly, it is 
important for the oil industry to search for new reservoirs in countries with petroleum 
resources, using the technological advances and innovations which allow exploring and 
producing hydrocarbons in areas that it was impracticable until now. 
The upstream sector of hydrocarbon business activities comprises exploration 
and production (E&P) cycle of oil industry. The initial phase is to carry out seismic 
exploration and exploratory drillings in order to discover accumulations of oil situated 
thousands of meters under the earth-ground. Production is the process of recovering 
those hidden resources for processing, marketing and use, if the techno-economic 
conditions permit. It is conceded that a new discovery is not put into production unless 
it is appraised to be commercially viable, in sufficient quantities and qualities and with 
an economically viable extraction cost.  
Upstream oil activities are considered as the most capital intensive as they 
require vast financial resources and infrastructure, entailing such a contrast between 
risk and reward, bearing in mind the commercial, physical and political risks that must 
be faced at every stage of such a usually international investment. 
 
                                                 
1 As stated by George Clemenceau (French Prime minister during the WW 1). In Rouzaut-Bret 
N./Favennec P., Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, 3rd edition, (2011), Editions Technip, Paris, p. 5. 
2 Picton-Tubervill G., Oil and Gas: A practical handbook, Globe, Law and Business, Globe Business 
Publishing Ltd, (2009), U.K., p. 5. 
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Hydrocarbon resources, State Sovereignty and Oil Industry 
Ownership of oil resources  
It is critical, in terms of due diligence, for an oil company to check at the outset 
the status of the territory within the contract area lies and whether there is a dispute 
between the host state and a neighbouring state with a competing claim over all or 
part of the territory.  
Under article 2 of the “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States” as 
formed by the 1974 UN GA Res. 3201 containing a “Declaration on the Establishment 
of a New International Economic Order3” every state has and shall freely exercise full 
permanent sovereignty including possession, use and disposal over all its wealth, 
natural resources and economic activities” and hence is responsible for maintaining a 
national legal regime for regulating petroleum operations. Also the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) confers on coastal states sovereign rights for “the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources4”.  
Therefore, all hydrocarbon resources in the soil and subsoil in internal waters 
and in the territorial sea, on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) come under the jurisdiction of the state5. States are free to recognize private 
ownership of these resources or they can treat them as state-owned. In the vast 
majority of countries, the owner of petroleum and the mineral resources in general is 
the state. The U.S.A. and Canada are the only countries still recognizing private 
ownership of petroleum.  
The Participants in the Oil Industry  
Given that states with significant hydrocarbon resources usually are unable to 
bear the risks of exploration and production of the oil resources located in their 
territory and lack the technical expertise, their governments usually decide to delegate 
the exploration and production of oil to foreign oil companies that are known to have 
                                                 
3 Makuch K. /Pereira R., Environmental and Energy Law, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, (2012), U.K., p. 202. 
4 Articles 56 and 77, the Convention, in Picton, op. cit., p. 7. 
5 Park P., International law for energy and the environment, CRC Press, 2nd edition, (2013), USA, p. 75. 
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the expertise, sophisticated technology and access to financial resources to undertake 
upstream oil operations.  
Therefore, a commercial relationship is established between an International 
Oil Company (IOC) or a consortium of companies and the state (HS)6 or a National Oil 
Company (NOC) which is controlled by the state. That relationship may constitute pole 
of convergence, divergence and tensions of public and private interest especially if we 
take into consideration that the state can always use its legitimate or administrative 
power to change the rules of the game. The tensions are mostly identified in the 
allocation of risk between the parties over the field’s producing life and particularly 
how profits are divided and how costs are to be treated in order to accomplish the 
state’s objectives regarding the development of the resources. In any case it is the IOC 
that takes the greatest risk especially in respect of exploration.  
The states’ primary goal is to explore the country’s petroleum basins, to 
develop and exploit the resources discovered, to put into production discoveries being 
undeveloped for technical or financial reasons. Further, in order to maximize its 
revenues while securing, if possible, returns to investors commensurate with the risks 
run during the exploration, the state should establish a sound, attractive, fair and 
stable fiscal and contractual regime, to supervise and monitor operations in 
consultation with the companies and to acquire expertise through the transfer of 
technology and skills.  
For oil companies the objectives are to recover the investments costs as soon 
as possible, to obtain a return consistent with company’s objectives, to gain access to 
oil reserves and to limit risk by diversifying their portfolio exploration and production 
acreage7.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 When a country opens the oil resources to development or participation to development by foreign 
companies is referred to as the host country (HC) or host state (HS). 
7 Rouzaut, op. cit., p. 177. 
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International Petroleum Practice 
The petroleum law may be specifically designed to deal with matters regarding 
exploration for oil and in case of commercially discovery, its production until 
decommissioning phase and site restoration operations at the end of exploitation8 
determining how to authorize IOC to carry out the said operations (as illustrated in 
Picture 1). Though, may also be a general mining law with special section reserved for 
petroleum issues. In the absence of a petroleum law the constitution itself may directly 
authorize the government to regulate petroleum issues. 
 
Picture 1: Upstream Oil & Gas Life Cycle (Source: 
https://www.slideshare.net/PuputAryanto/introduction-to-oil-and-gas-industry-upstream-
midstream-downstream, Risanto P., Introduction to Oil and Gas Industry, Upstream, 
Midstream, Downstream) 
                                                 
8 Duval C. et al., International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and 
Policy Aspects, 2nd edition, Barrows Company Inc., New York, (2009), USA, p. 129. 
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Authorisations of the aforementioned operations are awarded in the form of 
two types of petroleum regulatory systems either by the licensing concession system 
(LCS or licenses) or by the contractual system9.   
Licensing Concession System 
A petroleum license is an administrative authorization issued by the 
government and may be granted to an IOC under entirely defined terms in the national 
legislation for a specific type of oil operation either for exploration over a defined area 
(exploration license) including drilling, or for production (lease or concession) over a 
restricted development area authorizing the development and production for a 
specific period on an exclusive basis. Often non-exclusive licenses are conferred for 
geological and geophysical prospecting10.  
Even if such licenses are not governed by a distinct concession contract they 
are categorized from a legal point as pure concession agreements. In this case the 
signing of a contract is not necessary because all terms are fixed by the country’s laws 
and regulations and are non-negotiable (e.g. the environmental requirements). 
However, the state retains the right to modify at any time those fixed terms and 
conditions that are not negotiated and this is especially significant when applicable to 
the rate of taxation imposed by the state on the income from oil activities, causing 
investment insecurity and uncertainty in relation to the project feasibility.  
The licensing system is a royalty/tax system, primarily used by developed 
nations, under which the government will transfer title of the oil to a company if it is 
produced and a company then pays royalties and taxes.  
E&P Contractual System  
In cases where a country’s legislation and the fiscal regime are not fully defined 
by national law, then the award of E&P rights may result from the signing of a detailed 
E&P contract which defines any provisions not covered by the legislation regarding the 
exploration and production activity and the elements of the fiscal regime. Each E&P 
contract is associated with a fiscal regime consisting of economic and tax provisions 
                                                 
9 Mazzel M., Petroleum fiscal systems and contracts, Diplomica Verlag GmbH, (2010), Hamburg, p. 8. 
10 Hunter T., Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector, New horizons in environmental and energy 
law, Edward Elgar Publishing, (2015), U.K., U.S.A., p. 40. 
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defined by the country’s petroleum law applicable to the contract-holder and its main 
purpose is to determine how the profits are shared between the host country and the 
IOC (as summarized in Table 1, for the three main E&P petroleum agreements).  
 
 
Concession Production sharing contract (PSC) Service agreement (SA) 
Basic 
elements 
In its most basic form, a concessionary 
system has three components: royalty, 
deductions (such as operating costs, 
depreciation, depletion and amortization, 
and intangible drilling costs), and taxes. 
Under a PSC, the contractor receives a 
share of production for services 
performed. In its most basic form, a 
PSC has two components: cost 
recovery and the division of profit oil. 
However, many PSCs have four 
components: royalty, cost recovery, 
profit oil, and taxes. 
Under a SA, the contractor 
receives a fixed or variable fee 
for the services performed. 
Corporate income taxes may 
apply. 
Royalty 
The royalty is normally a percentage of the 
proceeds of the sale of the hydrocarbon. It 
can be determined on a sliding scale, the 
terms of which may be negotiable or 
biddable or statutory, and paid in cash or 
in kind. The royalty is tax deductible. 
Similar to concessionary systems. In 
addition, royalties are not normally 
cost recoverable but tax deductible. 
Not applicable. 
Fiscal 
costs 
The definition of fiscal costs is described 
in the legislation of the country or in the 
particular concessionary agreement. 
Royalties and operating expenditures are 
normally expensed in the year in which 
they occur, and depreciation is calculated 
according to applicable legislation. Some 
countries allow the deduction of 
investment credits, interest on financing, 
and bonuses. 
Fiscal costs are defined and rules for 
amortization and depreciation are 
established in the legislation of the 
country or in the particular PSC. After 
payment of royalties, the contractor is 
allowed to recover costs in accordance 
with contractual provisions (a cost 
recovery limit may apply). The 
remainder of the production is split 
between the host government and the 
oil company at a stipulated (often 
negotiated) rate. 
Fiscal costs are defined and 
rules for amortization and 
depreciation are established in 
the agreement. 
Cost 
recovery There are no cost recovery limits. 
Usually, costs can be recovered up to 
a limit as defined in the PSC. 
Cost recovery limits are 
sometimes imposed on 
the contractor. 
Taxable 
income 
The taxable income under a concessionary 
agreement may be taxed at the country’s 
basic corporate tax rate. Special 
investment incentive programs and special 
resource taxes may also apply. Tax losses 
may be carried forward until full recovery 
or for a limited period of time. 
Corporate taxes may apply or may be 
paid by the host government or its 
national oil company on behalf of the 
contractor. Income tax is calculated 
on taxable income 
(revenue net of royalties, allowable 
costs, and government share of profit 
oil). Tax losses may 
be carried forward until full recovery 
or for a limited period of time. 
Corporate taxes may apply or 
may be paid by the host 
government or national oil 
company on behalf of the 
contractor. Income tax is 
calculated on the difference 
between the service fees and 
the allowable costs. Tax losses 
may be carried forward until 
full recovery or for a limited 
period of time 
Table 1: Main Fiscal Elements of main Upstream Oil Agreements (Source: Tordo S. et al, 
Petroleum exploration and production rights, The World Bank, The World Bank Working paper 
No. 179, Washington D.C., (2010), U.S.A., p. 13) 
As petroleum industry has become globalized some countries use model 
contracts that have both standarised terms and clauses open for negotiation11. Model 
contracts have been developed by national and international petroleum industry to 
improve efficiency, are evidence of international best practices applied globally and 
have contributed to a global standardization of upstream petroleum contracts12.  
                                                 
11 Duval, op. cit., p. 131. 
12 Hunter, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
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Contractual system may be categorized into production sharing contracts, risk-
bearing service contracts, and non-risk bearing service contracts.  
Process of Awarding Rights for Oil Exploration and Production 
Generally, countries allocate petroleum E&P rights in various methods and may 
take the forms of: i) direct negotiations (open door systems) where the criteria for 
award are often not pre-defined and known to market participants, ii) of public 
tenders (the licensing rounds) through administrative procedures on the basis of 
criteria defined by the government and competitive bidding through auctions or iii) 
some countries they use a combination of the above methods. The auction procedure 
may include either cash bidding in which rights go to the highest bidder or work 
programme bidding with all financial provisions fixed by legislation where the license is 
awarded to the applicant that bids to spend the highest amount of work on 
exploration for petroleum in the license area13.  
The award of E&P licenses or contracts more often results today from 
competitive biddings organized by the host country pursuant to a transparent tender 
procedure, in order to broaden the number of competent applicants for an area and to 
ensure that E&P rights are awarded to the most efficient operators, where companies 
compete against to each other by offering the best terms14.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Tordo S. et al, Petroleum exploration and production rights, The World Bank, The World Bank Working 
paper No. 179, Washington D.C., (2010), U.S.A., pp. 12-13. Available from: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/785881468336848695/pdf/518400PUB0REPL101Official0
use0Only1.pdf, accessed 26/12/2017. 
14 The most favorable sealed-bid offer in bid letting process. 
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Types of Upstream (E&P) Oil Agreements 
There are four basic E&P types of contracts available in order to regulate the 
relations between the host government and the IOC and are the following: i) the 
Concession (license or lease), ii) the Production Sharing Agreements (PSA), iii) the 
Service Agreements (SA) and iv) the Participation Agreements (or Join Venture 
Agreements). In recent years a fifth type of agreement is also commonly used and is 
considered as hybrid agreement since it contains elements of more than one of the 
basic categories and fits to state’s unique political, financial, economic and resource 
needs15.   
In any case countries have the discretion to select the most appropriate type of 
upstream petroleum contract they consider, depending on the experience, the 
capabilities and the bargaining strengths of the host state equivalent to the petroleum 
potential of the offered acreage and the international oil market condition. 
Generally speaking upstream oil contracts are quite long-term agreements 
concerning a specific contractual area awarded to the investor on an exclusive basis by 
the host government. Although, each of these regimes may be used to accomplish the 
same purpose they are conceptually different from each other because each one of 
them grants different levels of control to the IOC, provides different levels of NOC 
involvement and state participation and different remuneration scheme16. 
Common Host-Government Contract Provisions 
Modern host government contracts in general consist of a document with 
several sections taking the form of articles and sub-articles containing administrative, 
operating, technical, legal, financial, taxation, commercial and other provisions which 
apply to the different phases of the contract (exploration and exploitation) and 
irrespective of their category contain in a great degree similar provisions and 
structures addressing the following issues:  
 The participants of the contract (it is already discussed above). 
                                                 
15 Smith E. et.al, International Petroleum Transactions, 3rd edition, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation, Colorado, (2010), USA, p. 429. 
16Ibid, p. 429. 
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 The scope of the agreement in which there is a description of the exclusive 
rights to carry on petroleum operations in the area, which are granted by the 
state to the oil company.    
 The contracting area for exploration and development (usually described in 
Annexes) and relinquishment17 schedule. The size and definition of the 
contracting area for the exploration and potential development activity which a 
host state makes available is specified showing the boundaries and indicating 
the coordinates of reference points and is of crucial importance since the 
contractual rights granted to the IOC are limited to that contract area. The 
contract holder cannot hold on to the entire area indefinitely. Part or parts of 
the original area must be relinquished in such a shape and size suitable to be 
offered once more for licensing.  
 The ownership of oil produced. A transfer of ownership of petroleum takes 
place from the owner of petroleum in situ (which is the state) to the holder of 
an exclusive production license at the moment the petroleum comes to the 
licensee’s well. 
 Duration and sub-periods. Usually there is an initial period and then further 
extensions. The initial exploration period begins when the contract takes effect 
and shall not extend beyond 10 years. Next, after a development plan with 
respect to any commercial discovery has been adopted the production period 
begins, the duration of which varies depending on the agreement but usually is 
authorized for a total period of 30 or 40 years, if production is economically 
viable.    
 Annual work programmes and budgets. The contract specifies whether the 
contract holder must comply with both work and expenditure programme for 
each year by type of activity. The contract holder must submit to government a 
work programme together with a budget for the coming year and any data 
obtained during operations. 
                                                 
17 Under which there is an express obligation for the IOC to enter into work programme and forces the 
IOC either to discover commercially marketable reserves and develop them according to the work plan 
approved by the oil ministry (or NOC) or to release the area back to the government. 
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 The obligations and rights of the contract holder. Indicatively, the contract 
holder will be obliged to execute all his operations according to the provisions 
of the contract, diligently and in accordance with Good Oilfield Practices 
regarding drilling, use, operation and decommissioning of oil installations. The 
company will be obliged to operate in a safe manner without harming the 
health of the employees or causing damages to the environment. The contract 
holder will be responsible for any damage from his conduct and will be obliged 
to compensate the government or any third parties for such damage. The rights 
of the contract holder such as exclusivity for the operations, tax incentives and 
other customs privileges or administrative facilities are also described in the 
contract.   
 State participation. In some contracts there are provisions permitting the state 
to participate (usually through an NOC) directly to the petroleum operations as 
a partner of the contract holder with a defined share on the basis of 
cooperation agreement. 
 Unitisation clause (is analyzed below as a type of contractual agreement). That 
clause ensures that the recoverable reserves are exploited in a coherent 
manner (e.g. by appointing a single operator, adopting a joint development). 
An unitisation programme must be submitted in the applicable timeframe to 
the government for approval.  
 Access to oil for the domestic or export market. The contract holder is 
responsible for the marketing of the oil products extracted and is obliged to 
obtain the best possible price and usually there is a requirement that the 
domestic market should have a first call on national production18. 
 The generations of revenue through royalties. Royalties is the most basic 
petroleum tax, expressed as a percentage of the oil volumes produced by the 
contract holder and is payable in cash or in kind.   
 Area rentals, fees, bonuses and other taxes that the contract holder may be 
obliged to pay.  
                                                 
18 Rouzaut, op. cit., p. 190. 
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 Social benefits. The Contract holder may be required to give priority to the 
training and employment of local personnel as well as priority to local products 
and services and in general in local development. 
 Environmental protection clause under which the contract holder should 
conduct all petroleum operations in a manner which will assure the protection 
of the environment and in full compliance with the environmental laws, the 
approved strategic environmental assessment (SEA), the Terms of Environment 
(ToE) resulting from the relevant Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and 
any additional Environmental Action Plan (EAP).  
 Force majeure. It means any event (act of God, acts of war, civil unrest) beyond 
the reasonable control of the party claiming to be affected, that allows the 
performance of any obligations to be suspended to the extent to which the 
relevant party is affected. 
 Modification of the agreement, stabilization clauses (they are discussed below), 
adaptation clauses in order to allow the HC and IOC to mutually renegotiate the 
agreement. It is defined how the agreement can be modified. The new 
conditions only apply to contracts which are granted after the effective date of 
the new regulations except for rules, permits and conditions regarding 
environmental matters since the latter will be made applicable subject to the 
proper transitional provisions to already existing or new contracts alike19.  
 Settlement of disputes. Initially there is a provision for amicable resolution of 
any dispute between the contract holder and the state. In the event of failure 
of the parties to reach an amicable settlement then the dispute shall be 
referred to the Sole Expert. Any serious dispute between the state and the 
investor that has not been resolved will be settled finally by arbitration using 
procedures established by international organisations. Any disputes of an 
operational or technical nature may be referred to technical experts.  
                                                 
19 Taverne B., Petroleum, industry and governments: A study of the involvement of industry and 
governments in the production and use of petroleum, Kluwer Law International BV, (2008), The 
Netherlands, p. 137.   
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 Applicable law is usually the law of the host state.  
Concessions  
Concessions are the oldest form of petroleum contracts, under which IOC were 
granted absolute proprietary and ownership rights over vast acreage of land (and of 
any hydrocarbons produced within the relevant area) for a relatively long period such 
as 60-90 years, providing to the IOC’s extensive control over the schedule and manner 
in which oil reserves were developed, in return for the payment of royalties and 
income taxes calculated upon the quantity of oil production. Because the 
concessionaire assumed all of the risks under the concession arrangement the rewards 
were usually weighted in its favour. That original concession regime was inequitable 
and criticized by many developing countries so has gradually evolved to the newer 
form of concession updated to better safeguard sovereign rights and the legitimate 
interests of the host country. 
With the modern concessions (licenses or leases) a government grants by a 
suitable tendering process an IOC or a consortium of companies, a license with the 
exclusive right20 for a specific type of petroleum operation, usually to explore for and 
produce oil within a specific area (the license area or block), for a specific period 
(maximum 30 or 40 years). New concessions allow some control by the host state, 
through a NOC, over the management and exploration of the resources.  
 As it is already mentioned above, the main financial gain by the host state arise 
from the payment of royalties21 (in line with the royalties’ market value), income taxes 
(if the venture is profitable) and other related payments (production bonus, surface 
fee) made by the IOC, if oil is produced22. The royalty is usually set as a sliding scale, 
based on level of production. In some countries, the taxation is established by the 
general revenue laws applied to corporate entity profits while in other countries an 
IOC may pay for oil ventures a corporate income tax and a special petroleum tax. The 
IOC may also be required to pay a signature bonus (or license fee) to the government 
in order to secure the license. Some governments pursue to acquire indirect benefits 
                                                 
20 As long as the license is valid and subject to certain conditions, the licensee is authorized to exercise 
the rights conferred in the license against third parties. 
21 High levels of royalties may discourage investors and prevent further investments. 
22 Makuch, op. cit., pp. 210-211. 
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by supporting local content in several ways such as, imposing the concessionaire to 
provide training and employment for workers from the host country or that certain 
technology developed by the licensee be transferred to the host country23.  
All petroleum resources are owned by the host country in situ (before they are 
extracted from the subsoil), but ownership of any extracted petroleum transfers to the 
IOC at the wellhead. Ownership of equipment and installation permanently affixed to 
the ground generally passes to the host state at the expiry of the concession or 
sometimes until the expended costs have been recovered and the IOC is typically 
responsible for abandonment and site restoration. This transfer of title of asset 
facilities does not apply to leased equipment. Concessions can be considered as a 
relatively free market regime, under which the IOC bears all of the risks in the venture 
and enjoys share of the benefits and is allowed to pursue its interest with relative 
freedom, subject to the timing, environmental and other constraints imposed by the 
terms and conditions of the license24.  
Production Sharing Agreemnts (PSA) 
The concept of production sharing first introduced in Indonesia in 1966 when it 
was decided to abandon the traditional concession in favor of the PSC and since then 
PSA have become widespread and they are the most common type of contractual 
systems in many developing countries25. A PSA is a contractual relationship between 
the host state (represented by NOC, which will take delivery of the state’s share of 
production) and an IOC, as a contractor or service provider, authorizing the latter to 
undertake petroleum exploration and production with the particular terms of the 
agreement within a specified area for a defined period in exchange for the entitlement 
to a defined share of the produced oil. The contractor bears the entire exploration risk 
of the project and is usually in charge of the operation and management of contract 
area, except where the contract provides the host state with the option to participate 
                                                 
23 E.g. under the Turkish Petroleum Code, Article 120, Law No. 6326 (1954), providing that “Petroleum 
rights owners shall financially sponsor special education and training abroad or in Turkey of Turkish 
citizens, not to be less than 25% of foreign persons they employ”. (Smith, op. cit., pp. 448-451). 
24 Picton, op. cit., p. 29. 
25 E.g. in Malaysia, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Central Asian Republics of the Former Soviet Union, China and 
many other countries.  
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directly in the venture26. The state always remains the owner of the natural resources 
and only transfers title to the IOC’s share of the oil once it has been produced. A 
royalty may be payable to host country on all oil produced.  
The initial proportion of oil production is known as cost oil which is sold on the 
open market or back to the NOC and is provided to remunerate the IOC and recoup its 
costs and capital and operational expenditures. It may be a limit on what proportion of 
oil production in any year can count as cost oil. The remaining oil, once costs and 
royalties have been recovered is known as profit oil and is allocated between the state 
and the investor in agreed proportions, typically at a rate of about 80% for the 
government and 20% for the company27.  
The IOC generally pays income tax to the HC on its share of profit oil, as well as 
other taxes. It should be mentioned that profitability of a field will also be dependent 
upon the current market price for oil28. The PSA once it is negotiated and signed, often 
becomes part of national legislation, providing in that way legal security to the IOC. 
Contractors are required to submit a production programme and a budget in order to 
be approved by the NOC. Under the PSA the NOC retains the ownership of all 
equipment and installations, with the possible exception of leased equipment, used for 
operations once the terms of the PSA have finally expired or at payout29. 
Although there is no a standard PSA model for all countries due to several 
factors unique to each country, however many states have model contracts which are 
frequently used as basis for bidding and the start of negotiations between the IOC and 
the HG30. 
Service Agreements (SA) 
Under an SA the state hires an IOC, for a fee, to provide technical and financial 
services relating to the exploration and production of oil, within a specified area and 
for a specific time period. The state retains full ownership of petroleum being 
                                                 
26 Chioma E., Examining the crucial impact of a well-drafted stabilization and renegotiation clause on 
PSA, I.E.L.R. 2015, 5, 212-217, Sweet & Maxwell and its contributors, Westlaw, 2017 Thomson Reuters, 
p. 2. 
27 Makuch, op. cit., p. 211. 
28 Hunter, op. cit., p. 39. 
29 Smith, op. cit., p. 464. 
30 Hunter, op. cit., p. 39. 
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produced on its soil in situ or produced. SA have been adopted mainly in Latin America 
and in some countries of Middle East, such as Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with 
strong elements of energy nationalism and due to constitutional provisions that 
actually prohibit foreign control or ownership of their natural resources. SA can be 
divided into two types: Risk service contracts (RSC) and pure service contracts (PSC31).  
Under risk service contract the contractor provides all capital and management, 
under the control of NOC, bearing all the exploration risk. If commercial oil reserves 
are found, the IOC contractor is reimbursed, in cash (convertible currency, usually 
USD), rather than share of the produced oil, with a service fee (with interest) in order 
to recover its investment and operating costs and to provide for a profit element for its 
services. Some RSC (such as in Brazil) in the case where access to petroleum is 
important for the service contractor, give the IOC the right to purchase portion of the 
oil produced from the host state at a discounted price (market value price32).  
Pure service contract is a simple contract of services where the contractor 
carries out certain services (e.g. engineering, consulting, constructions, managerial and 
other development or exploration services) of existing oilfields, without bearing any 
exploration risk, since risks and rewards are retained by the state. The contractor is 
compensated with a flat fee for its services and has no right to the produced oil. This 
type of contracts includes management contracts (e.g. start-up assistance) and turnkey 
drilling contracts entered into between an oil company and a service company 
engaged in the business of drilling wells for hire33. 
Participation Agreements (PA) 
The participation agreements involve the creation of an association of two or 
more entities, private or public, or a combination of private IOC and public (through an 
NOC) as part of the consortium, in order to share risks and rewards for large scale or 
high-risk venture. Under joint venture the state acquires participatory interests in 
exploration and production process taking place within its territory. Thus, the form of 
joint venture (JV) may be considered not as a separate form of contract, but as an 
                                                 
31 Smith, op. cit., p. 482. 
32 This buy back clause is also a kind of security to the contractor for receiving its remuneration in case 
the host state faces problems with timely paying the service fee. (Duval et al., op. cit., 134.). 
33 Smith, op. cit., p. 482. 
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agreement which is adjunct to a concession, PSA, or even a risk-service agreement34. 
Usually the participation rights are negotiated between the host state and the IOC, 
although the proportion of state participation may be fixed by legislation. Some other 
main features of these agreements include that each partner contributes to the costs 
and shares, the benefits or losses according to its proportionate equity in the 
partnership. In an operating agreement the legal relationship between the partners, 
the rules and procedures for the joint development are established35.  
Joint Operation Agreements (JOA) 
The JOA in petroleum industry is an underlying contractual framework of a joint 
venture and particularly is a contract where two or more parties agree to undertake a 
common task to explore and exploit an area for hydrocarbons, usually in international 
level36. The parties to the agreement can be classified as operators and non-operators 
according to the volume of interests. The party with the largest interest in the 
agreement is usually the operator of the agreement and is responsible for the day-to-
day management and operation of the field. The operator is appointed by the 
participants of the JOA and must also be approved by the state agency or NOC 
overseeing the operations. Each JOA should establish the basis for sharing rights and 
liabilities among the parties, though in most cases these are shared in proportion to 
the interests of the participants.  
Further, it is critical to provide the manner in which operations will be 
conducted by a designated operator subject to the supervision of an operating 
committee. The main duty of the operator is to conduct operations in a diligent, safe 
and efficient manner in order to increase the profitability of the operations. JOA are 
most commonly conducted pursuant to a model form developed by an industry 
association, such as the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), the 
American Association of Petroleum Landmen (AAPL) and contain certain elements in 
common and ancillary provisions to address all the related issues. 
                                                 
34 Smith, op. cit., p. 492. 
35 Makuch, op. cit. p. 212. 
36 Waqas M., Joint Operation Agreements, Oil & Gas Financial Journal, 10/9/2014, 
http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-11/issue-10/features/joint-operating-agreements.html, 
accessed 2/2/2018.   
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Joint Study and Bid Agreements (JSBA) 
In the context of the JOA, where a number of several companies on a consortium basis 
planning to bid on a host country agreement for the award of a new license the JSBA, 
as a pre-development agreement and part of a pre-bid consortium arrangement, is 
intended to govern the relationship between them and the terms upon which their 
consortium will operate. JSBA governs the above relationship prior to the award of the 
license whilst the JOA governs the said relationship after the award, if the application 
is successful. The JSBA is a short-term agreement of practical importance and is 
developed as a model form by the AIPN containing the following terms regarding the 
role of the operating committee, grounds for removal of the operator, voting issues, 
non-consent and sole risk, approval of expenditure, withdrawal and relinquishment, 
decommissioning and force majeure37. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Kenyon A., The Joint Study and Bidding Agreement, 5/2/2014, 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/291040/Oil+Gas+Electricity/The+Joint+Study+and+Bidding+Ag
reement, accessed 2/2/2018.  
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Upstream Agreements during the Execution of Contract  
Farm-out Agreements (FOA) 
A FOA is a contractual agreement with an owner (“farmor”) who holds a 
working interest (drilling rights) in an oil lease to assign all or part of that interest to 
another party (“farmee”) in exchange for fulfilling contractually specified conditions 
(drilling and testing obligations). The agreement often stipulates that the farmee must 
drill a well to a certain depth, at a specified location, within a certain time-frame and 
carries the farmor for all or a portion for the drilling costs38. Unlike the US farm-outs 
where it is typical for the farmee to become the operator and sole owner of the 
farmed-out interest, in the international farm-out agreements the farmee rarely 
becomes the operator and may not even be required to conduct any particular 
operational function.  
In international FOA the parties have to take into consideration the fact that 
most host countries retain a right to approve any assignment of an interest in the 
exploration or production agreement. The most significant reason for farming-out is 
when a company is incapable of developing acreage due to budgetary constraints or 
wishes to reduce risk and is willing to accept in return a reduced acreage position. On 
the other side farming-in makes sense if a company’s budget can afford the drilling 
costs and the company is ready to accept greater risks in order to increase the 
percentage of its acreage position in a particular developing area. The most crucial 
terms and conditions negotiating in a FOA are the extent of the farmor’s maximum 
commitment when sharing exploration costs, the duty imposed to the farmee in order 
to earn interests in the acreage, what will be assigned to the farmee when the 
requirements are satisfied and what the farmor will reserve. 
Unitization Agreements 
In some instances an oil field may underlie two or more adjacent license or 
concession areas which are often held by different licensees or concession holders. 
The producers of adjacent licenses in order to avoid competitive development of the 
                                                 
38 Smith, op. cit., p. 534. 
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reservoir that can lead to excessive drilling, wasteful production and controversies 
over property rights, they may decide to jointly develop common fields as single unit, 
according to the geophysical boundaries, to maximize efficient production from the 
common field. This process is known as “unitization” and can apply to several adjacent 
reservoirs in one country but also can apply to cross-border fields (e.g. U.K. and 
Holland) in the case of an intergovernmental agreement.  
Unitization agreement basically is an agreement negotiated and entered into 
by the producers, combining all of the acreage in the developing fields and regulates 
the basis upon which the unitization will take place and the way the unitized field will 
be operated between the unitizing producers39. The only available model form of 
unitization agreement has been developed by the AIPN and contains clauses regarding 
the intention of the producers to operate the field as a unit, the percentage interest to 
be held by each group and possibly provision for a redetermination of that interest, 
the appointment of a unit operator and an operating committee, the operator’s rights 
and duties, voting issues, ownership and disposal of the oil produced, expenditure and 
budgeting and other relevant to the development of the field issues.       
 
                                                 
39 Picton, op. cit., p. 58. 
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Stabilization Clauses 
Given that oil projects span for a long term and are capital intensive are prone 
to political40, regulatory, legislative and fiscal risks. In order to secure their investment 
during the life circle of the agreement through the stability of the contractual regime, 
IOC from the outset of their operations seek the use of risk mitigation tools to manage 
such risks arising from the demands of the host state to review the initial terms of their 
agreement. This practice reflects and is based on the public international law principle 
pacta sund servanda (the sanctity of contracts).  
Stabilisation clauses are a mechanism actually intending to stabilise the legal 
environment surrounding the oil contract and in particular the contents and status of 
the law of the host state in order to safeguard the IOC against any unilateral 
termination or modification in the agreement, by legislative, administrative act or any 
other means by the host state without prior mutual consent of the contracting parties 
that will affect the economic profitability of the venture and the contractual regime 
entered by the parties41. Modifications preferred by the host state aiming to increase 
its take may be of various kinds such as by increasing present taxes, by enacting new 
taxes upon venture or imposing new obligations through legislation42.  
Current features of stabilization clauses in oil contracts 
 Stabilization clauses may take different forms in various different oil contracts. 
However, a distinction has been made between stabilization clauses “stricto sensu” (or 
freezing clauses) and the economic equilibrium clauses.  
Under freezing clauses the legislation of the host state applicable to the 
contract is fixed on the day the contract is signed and applies until the conclusion of 
the contract. This means that the state agrees that any change to legislation enacted 
                                                 
40 IOCs should always take into consideration the risk of expropriation and nationalization of investment 
projects. 
41 Montembault B., The stabilization of state contracts using the example. A return of the Gods of 
Olympia?, I.B.L.J. 2003, 6, 593-643, Sweet & Maxwell and its contributors, Westlaw, 2017 Thomson 
Reuters, p. 2. 
42 Smith, op. cit., pp. 508-509. 
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after the date of the contract is signed will not apply to the contract, actually freezing 
the application of new legislation or regulations to the venture43.  
The economic equilibrium clauses (or rebalancing clauses) are embedded in the 
rational that requires the agreement to be performed with the appropriate contractual 
good faith. In that context such clauses do not attempt to reject the application of new 
legislation upon the agreement but actually they function as indemnity clauses, by 
providing balance to the economic equilibrium of the contract ensuring that 
appropriate compensation is paid to the IOC if the state’s action adversely affects the 
economic benefits of the agreement44. This type of clauses are of practical use when 
expropriation occurs, since under international law a stabilization clause will not stop 
the expropriation,  but it often will affect the measure of the damages that the 
company can receive in an arbitration proceeding45. It should be mentioned that 
economic equilibrium may not involve direct payment in cash to the company, but it 
could be achieved by adjusting the tariffs or reducing the taxes and royalties payable 
by the company to the host state or through an extension of the lifespan of the 
concession46.  
In some instances, stabilization clauses may take the form of intangibility 
clauses (or inviolability clauses) which ensure that the host state cannot unilaterally 
modify or terminate the terms of the contract, without the mutual consent of the 
contracting parties. However, there is the argument that the legal effect of the 
stabilization clauses depend on the scope and the duration of the clauses. That was 
illustrated in the Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), where the 
arbitral tribunal refused to read a stabilization clause as preventing the state of Kuwait 
from nationalizing a concession for an especially long period of 60 years47.  
 
 
                                                 
43 Freehills H., Stabilisation clauses: issues and trends, as cited at Lexology, (3 June 2010), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5976193-1acd-4082-b9e7-87c0414b5328 accessed 
6/1/2018. 
44 Chioma, op. cit., p. 4. 
45 Al-Emadi T., Stabilization clauses in international joint venture agreements, I.E.L.R. 2010, 3, 54-63, 
Sweet & Maxwell and its contributors, Westlaw, 2017 Thomson Reuters, p. 2. 
46 Oshionebo E., Stabilization contracts in natural resource extraction contracts: Legal implications for 
developing countries, Asper Rev. I.B.T.L. 2010, 10, L1, Asper Review of International Business and Trade 
Law, p. 3. 
47 Ibid, p. 7. 
-23- 
Stabilization clauses and environmental standards 
While stabilization clauses may be beneficial to the investors in the sense that 
they assure a stable and predictable investment environment however, there are 
concerns whether such clauses are of any benefit to the development aspirations of 
developing countries and to what extend the clauses have the potential to impede the 
capacity of the host state to regulate the activities of the IOC particularly in relation to 
environmental protection, health and safety regulations and human rights issues48. A 
growing body of international and European law on environmental protection has 
emerged through considerable number environmental treaties which place obligations 
upon the states that are members to them to bring its national legal systems in line 
with the new international standards. Therefore, states cannot commit themselves not 
to take measures that they are required to receive concerning environmental 
standards under international or European law. Hence, the scope of stabilization 
clauses may be limited by a “compliance with international law” exception49. 
As an overview the trend is that investors tend to favour economic equilibrium 
clauses with clear compensation mechanisms over other types. Stabilization clauses 
are now limited to a few specific fiscal issues or rates and the host state holds the 
unilateral right to issue new regulations applicable to any contract-holder and take into 
account new environmental conditions, health, labour and safety priorities50. Many 
developed countries (e.g. U.S.A., U.K., Canada, Norway, Australia) do not offer 
stabilization clauses because their fiscal systems are sufficiently stable minimizing the 
need for such devices. It could be said that in any case the presence of stabilization 
clauses in a petroleum contract should be considered as a psychological boost giving 
confidence to investors when they take the decision to invest and can thus, have an 
important market function in developing countries and at the same time act as a tool 
in order to attract investments51. 
                                                 
48 Ibid. p. 10. 
49 Cotula L., Regulatory takings, stabilization clauses and sustainable development, OECD Global Forum 
on International Investment VII, 27-28 March 2008, 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf, accessed 6/2/2018.   
50 Duval, op. cit., p. 141. 
51 Mansour M./ Dr. Nakhle S., Fiscal stabilization in oil and gas contracts: Evidence and implications, OIES 
Paper: SP37, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 2016, University of Oxford, p. 13. Available 
from: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Fiscal-Stabilization-in-Oil-
and-Gas-Contracts-SP-37.pdf, accessed 20/11/2017. 
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“Lex Petrolea” 
Although the exploration and production of onshore oil is a global business 
involving transnational flows of capital, labour and equipment however, is largely 
regulated by national petroleum regimes. Despite the fact of the absence of a 
multilateral treaty which could regulate the petroleum business, by establishing 
specific obligations upon the participating parties of the petroleum arrangements, 
there has been a process of internationalization of domestic principles, laws and ways 
of conducting oil business, which has led to the development of many common legal 
principles applied worldwide in the petroleum industry52. 
 
The development of Lex Petrolea 
In order to provide a better picture of the legal regime of oil contracts, it is 
appropriate to consider the development and scope of lex petrolea which is a set of 
customary rules, valid for the international petroleum industry. It is developed based 
on four sources: i) national petroleum laws, ii) national and international dispute 
settlements and the relevant arbitral awards in the energy sector, iii) host 
governments’ contracts and iv) the industry’s business practice which is found in 
model contracts.  
The term first arose in a benchmark international arbitration case in Kuwait v. 
AMINOIL53 in 1982. In an arbitration arising from the expropriation of AMINOIL’s 
petroleum concession through the nationalization of the oil industry by the Kuwaiti 
government, part of the dispute concerned the assessment of the relevant 
compensation. The government of Kuwait argued that a number of international 
negotiations and settlements about compensations in the period 1971-1977 had 
generated a customary rule specific to the oil industry – a lex petrolea that was in 
                                                 
52 Hunter, op. cit., pp. 34-35.  
53 Government of the State of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Co (AMINOIL), Award of 24 May 1982, 
21 ILM (1982) 976, 9 Yearbook  of Commercial Arbitration 71(1984). Available from: https://www.trans-
lex.org/261900/_/ad-hoc-award-kuwait-v-the-american-independent-oil-company-21-ilm-976/.  
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some sort a particular branch of a general universal “lex mercatoria”54. The Arbitral 
tribunal rejected this characterization of these so called precedents as a lex petrolea55.    
One of the four potential sources of lex petrolea, the national petroleum 
legislations can be found now in oil producing countries, but while them may share a 
basic common framework, their terms vary and thus cannot be considered to provide 
laws of general acceptance or a model legal regime. 
International oil business practices, which are found in model contracts 
prepared by international organizations or associations (such as AIPN), can also supply 
industry standards leading to the creation of new transnational common rules, 
because due to the fact that are widely used and accepted, they have the legitimacy 
and are accepted as part of custom and usage and hence the most credible source of 
lex petrolea56. Additionally, lex petrolea will be supported by the notion of 
international “good oilfield practice” with the expectation to become industry 
standards and create common transnational rules. The definition of “good oilfield 
practice” indicates practices and procedures commonly employed in the petroleum 
industry by prudent and diligent operators relating particularly to resource 
conservation, operational safety and environmental safety and preservation57. 
Host governments’ contracts may contribute to the existence of lex petrolea 
even though there are no model host government contracts. However, in recent years 
we can observe the adoption of common types of host governments contracts as well 
as common principles, clauses, terms and conditions. 
Lex petrolea development came through the published international arbitration 
awards of international arbitrators and arbitral tribunals comprising legal rules 
adapted to the industry’s nature and peculiarities. International arbitration is the 
major type of dispute settlement procedure for international petroleum industry. 
There are four categories of disputes found in the international petroleum sector and 
are either: i) between states, in the context of boundary issues concerning oil fields 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 Daintith T., Against “lex petrolea”, The Journal of World Energy Law & Business, Volume 10, Issue 1, 1 
March 2017, Pages 1–13. Available from: https://academic.oup.com/jwelb/article/10/1/1/2807096, 
Oxford Academic, Published: 4 January 2017, accessed 3/12/2017. 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 Rouzaut, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 
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that cross international boundaries, ii) investors (IOC) and states, in the context of the 
investment disputes iii) between companies in relation to disputes arising from oil 
contracts and iv) between individuals and states. In order to determine the full extent 
of lex petrolea, we have to take into consideration the range of disputes in the oil 
industry which have been settled.  
The subject of disputes ranges from the validity of E&P agreements, the 
application and issuance of the exploration licenses, project management, taxation, 
compensations in case of expropriation, the disposal of produced hydrocarbons, the 
transfer of interests in the project and force majeure to the frustration and repudiation 
of host government petroleum agreements and remedies for breach of contract58.  
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The EC Hydrocarbon Directive (94/22/EC) 
As energy plays a fundamental role in our daily lives and is central to every 
aspect of economic activity, European integration has always been about energy 
issues. The continuously growing oil demand, the lack of sufficient domestic oil 
resources in many Member States, the necessity for reasonable oil prices plus the fact 
of supply shortages due to oil crises, resulted to the EU initiative for the completion of 
the internal market for energy products59.  Therefore, the European Union adopted 
the Directive 94/22/EC (L. 164/3) on the conditions for granting and using 
authorisations for the prospecting, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in EC 
member states.  
Directive laid down common rules which must be followed by the competing 
authorities when granting new licenses under the respective regimes60. The aim of the 
Directive was to make licensing procedures transparent by ensuring non-
discrimination, equal access to all entities and that authorisations are granted on the 
basis of objective, published criteria known in advance by all entities taking part in the 
procedures61.  
Moreover due to many areas of the Community are not yet explored, the 
function of the Directive was to open up the hydrocarbons market to greater 
competition by removing procedural barriers, reducing excessive state participation 
and lightening the burden of diverse regulations62, introducing at the same time the 
principle of reciprocity where Member States’ entities should enjoy in third countries a 
treatment comparable to that enjoyed by third countries’ entities in the Community. 
Principal Provisions 
Member States continue to have sovereignty over their hydrocarbon reserves 
and retain the right to determine which areas within their territories they will license. 
Member States may refuse awarding a license to an entity on grounds of national 
                                                 
59 Kruger H., European energy law and policy: An introduction, Edward Elgar Publishing, (2016), U.K., 
U.S.A., p.146. 
60 Taverne, op. cit., p.249.   
61 In the recitals of the Directive 94/22/EC.  
62 Park, op. cit., p. 209. 
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security or if the applicant is effectively controlled by third countries or third countries 
nationals63. Further, Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
authorisations are granted following a procedure which is initiated either by a notice 
of the competent authority, inviting applications to be published in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities at least 90 days before the closing date for applications 
or by means of a notice inviting applications to be published in the Official Journal of 
the European Communities, following submission of an application by an entity 
without prejudice to Article 2(1). Other interested entities shall have a period of at 
least 90 days after the date of publication in which to submit an application. 
 Notices shall specify the type of authorization, the geographical areas or areas 
in part or all of which an application has been made and the proposed date or time 
limit for granting authorization64. Some reasonable exceptions to the above procedure 
are included in Article 3(3).  
Under Article 4, Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure 
that the duration of an authorization does not exceed the period necessary to carry 
out the activities, including any extensions granted by the competent authorities under 
certain conditions in order to complete the proper activities. The objective of limiting a 
single entity’s reservation of exclusive rights over areas that could be better developed 
by several other entities is extended to both the extent of areas of authorization and 
to the duration of any authorization. 
The licensing authority, under Article 5, can choose between competing offers 
and entities only determined on the basis of the following criteria: 1) The technical and 
financial capability of the applicant, 2) the way in which the entity propose to perform 
the relevant activities, 3) whether the authorization is put up for sale and tenders are 
invited, the price which the entity is prepared to pay in order to obtain the 
authorization, 4) where two or more applicants have equal merit, when assessed 
according to the specific criteria, the competent authorities may take into account any 
other objective and non-discriminatory criteria in order to make a final choice among 
these applications. The authorities may also take into consideration, when appraising 
                                                 
63 Art. 2, para. 2 of the Directive 94/22/EC, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022:EN:HTML accessed 18 January 2018. 
64 Art. 3, para. 2 of the Directive 94/22/EC. 
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their applications, any lack of efficiency and responsibility displayed by the applicants 
in operations under previous authorisations. Any changes made to the conditions and 
requirements in the course of the procedure are notified to all interest entities. 
Further, any entity, whose license application is unsuccessful, the entity may request 
to be given explanations and the reasons for the decision.  
Under Article 6 of the Directive Member States may, to the extent justified by 
reasons such as of national security, public safety, public health, protection of 
environment, safety of installations and of workers, planned management of 
hydrocarbon resources, the need to secure tax revenues and due to any other reason 
of public interest, to impose conditions and requirements on the exercise of the 
activities of prospecting, exploring for and producing hydrocarbons.  
In the case of state’s participation, a Member State may continue with the 
provision that a “Chinese wall” exists between the Member State as a licensing 
authority and the Member State as the participating licensee, usually through a joint 
development agreement65. The Directive requires the state that holds the 
authorisations and the state as legal entity managing the state’s share to abstain from 
voting on procurement matters and not exercise a majority voting control on other 
decisions. Any flow of information between these two entities is subject to appropriate 
limitations, as well as any vote by the state or the legal entity shall not prevent the 
management decisions of the entity from being based on normal commercial 
principles. Also the State shall put in place arrangements requiring the said legal entity 
to keep separate accounts for its commercial role and its role as a manager of the 
State’s participation and guaranteeing that there is no flow of information between 
these two entities66. 
The Hydrocarbon Directive is far from perfect in its contribution to an internal 
energy market. It leaves considerable gaps in terms of remaining governmental 
discretion, residual obstacles for external companies in competition against, and 
negotiations with, state-owned petroleum companies and the possibility of a Member 
State cutting an informal deal with a non-Member State on terms of reciprocal access, 
thereby excluding companies from other Member States. However, it is considered an 
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66 Art. 6 (3) of the Directive 94/22/EC. 
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important step forward in providing specific rules accepted by governments and the 
industry making Europe a more attractive venue of oil field development67. 
                                                 
67 Talus K., EU energy law and policy: A critical account, 1st edition, Oxford University Press, (2013), U.K., 
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Selected Countries’ Licensing Regime 
GREECE 
Despite the fact that Greece is a country of hydrocarbon potential, almost all of the 
crude oil used in Greece is imported in order to cover country’s energy needs because 
the upstream sector is not yet developed enough68. However, Greece has 
implemented comprehensive energy sector reforms towards creating competitive 
energy markets by promoting hydrocarbon activity through an investment friendly 
regulatory framework. The market has changed and opportunities are revealed for 
investors, helping the Greek E&P activities to undergo significant restructuring, 
thereby providing economic recovery and generally sustainable growth for the Greek 
society69.  
Recent Hydrocarbon Developments  
In this regard the Greek state launched an open tender (“with open door 
invitation”) in 2012 and in 2014 and three exploration licenses (lease agreements) 
were signed between the Greek state and three consortia, for one onshore (Ioannina) 
and two offshore blocks (Katakolo and West Patraikos Gulf). Also it was granted a 25 
years exploitation license in 2016 for an area in Katakolo block with expecting 
production from the block starting by 2019-202070.  
Due to this confidence shown by investors in the Greek upstream sector, 
HHRM71 is planning to launch a new bidding round in 2018 for the rest offshore blocks 
that did not receive bids in 2014 and inviting bids for new exploration onshore blocks 
in Northern Greece72. 
                                                 
68 International Energy Agency, Energy supply security 2014: Emergency reports for IEA countries, IEA 
Publications, 2014, France, p. 218, 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ENERGYSUPPLYSECURITY2014.pdf 
accessed 20/1/2018. 
69 International Energy Agency, Energy Policy for IEA countries 2017 review (Greece), IEA Publications, 
2017, France, p. 33, 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EnergyPoliciesofIEACountriesGreeceRevi
ew2017.pdf, accessed 19/1/2018. 
70 Ibid, p. 33. 
71 A state authority for promotion of the upstream hydrocarbon activity overseen by the Minister of 
Environment and Energy. 
72 International Energy Agency, Energy Policy for IEA countries 2017 review (Greece), op. cit., p. 33. 
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Regulatory Regime 
Law 2289/1995, which has transposed the 94/22/EC on the conditions for 
granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons, constitutes the applicable legal framework governing the upstream 
hydrocarbons operations in Greece. Law 2289/1995 was further amended by law 
4001/2011 which updated the legal framework, by incorporating new practices, such 
as the “the non-exclusive seismic surveys” and “open door” bidding process, and 
established a new state authority for the promotion of the hydrocarbon upstream 
practice: the Hellenic Hydrocarbon Resources Management S.A. (HHRM)73. 
All of the rights and obligations relating to the prospecting, exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons are vested in HHRM74, which has the management and 
monitoring of the existing state agreements, the conduct of all relevant exploration 
and production tenders as well as the evaluation of offers received. The exploration 
and production rights may be granted through the conclusion of a lease agreement or 
a production sharing agreement 75. PD 127/1996 sets the basic terms and conditions 
regarding the lease agreement, while Law 2289/1995 sets forth the general terms and 
conditions in relation to the production sharing agreement. Greece is committed to all 
relevant international protocols, agreements and EU legislation, actively encouraging 
best practices and recently has adopted the 2013/30/EC Offshore Safety Directive 
under Law 4409/201676. 
Granting of the prospecting right  
HHRM issues an invitation for submission of applications for prospecting 
hydrocarbons that is approved by the Minister of the Environment, Energy and Climate 
Change and is published properly in the Government Gazette and in the Official 
                                                 
73 By virtue of the Presidential Decree (PD) 14/2012 (OGG 21/A/2012). 
74 It is also responsible for the preparation of the relevant contracts the supervision of their appropriate 
performance, the preparation of all environmental protection, labour, safety and security regulations 
that will govern any oil company in Greece. 
75 Strong, The Oil and Gas Law Review, Law Business Research Ltd., (2016), U.K., p. 101. Available from: 
https://thelawreviews.co.uk/digital_assets/ac23c1b2-f6c9-4fd6-82a9-270ac25669e3/TLR---Oil-&-Gas---
Fourth-Edition---Book-(UNSECURED).pdf, accessed 18/1/2018. 
76 HHRM, (2018), http://www.greekhydrocarbons.gr/index.php/legal-fiscal-
terms/hseq/itemlist/category/14-legal-fiscal-terms accessed in 17 January 2018. 
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Journal of the European Union77. Indicatively, the invitation includes the area that shall 
be subject to prospecting, the terms and obligations of the licensee, the criteria for the 
selection, the amount of the fee payable, the deadline for the granting of the license 
(which is approved by the Minister and shall be valid for up to eighteen months) and 
any other relevant information78. 
Granting of the exploration and production right  
According to Article 2 of the Law 2289/199579 the exploration and production 
rights are granted for block areas either: 
i) By following an invitation to tender, approved by the Minister, and published in 
the Government Gazette and in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
ii) Or following the submission of application by an interested party for an area 
not included in the invitation to tender.  
iii) Or through an open door invitation for expression of interest, if the area under 
discussion is available on a permanent basis or has been subjected previously 
to a tender that was not completed with an execution of a lease or a PSA, or 
has been abandoned by the contractor.  
The offers are evaluated following negotiations with the interested parties and 
the one most financially advantageous to the Greek state is selected80.  
The duration of the exploration stage is 7 years for onshore areas and 8 years 
for offshore areas81. It is usually divided in three phases each one linked to a separate 
work program and either at the end of each phase will enter the succeeding phase or 
will withdraw from further commitments. The production stage shall have a maximum 
duration of 25 years from the date on which the contractor notifies the Greek state 
that it has tracked down a commercially exploitable crude oil deposit82. An extension 
                                                 
77 The submission deadline of the applications is specified in the invitation and cannot be less than 
ninety (90) days from the last publication. 
78 Panagos Th., “The exploration and production of hydrocarbons: The regulatory framework in Greece”, 
publications Sakkoula, (2014), Athens-Thessaloniki, p. 59. 
79 As it is amended by L. 4001/2011. 
80 Farantouris N. / Kosmides T., “The law of hydrocarbons”, Nomiki Bibliothiki S.A., (2015), Athens, 
p.243-244.  
81 Article 5(1) L. 2289/1995 as amended by Article 158 (1) L. 4001/2011 
82 Article 5(8) L. 2289/1995. 
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for both stages may be approved under specific terms and written consent of the 
Lessor described in the Agreement83.  
In the invitation to tender apart from the requirements for participation and 
the evaluation criteria (e.g. minimum financial capability and technical expertise of the 
interested parties) shall also include the royalty offered by the interested parties in 
case of a lease agreement and the participation share of the hydrocarbon offered to 
the Greek state in case of production sharing agreement, as well as the signature 
bonus, the production bonus and surface fees. 
Regarding to dispute settlement all disputes among the parties related either 
to the performance of the terms of the agreement or to any non-contractual liability 
shall be settled through arbitration, international commercial arbitration or any other 
internationally recognized arbitration system such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) or the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 
excluding ordinary proceedings of the Greek courts or other court jurisdictions. 
However, it is provided that the parties for a number of serious disputes shall be 
referred for determination to a Sole Expert. 
 
Taxation Regime 
According to the applicable legislation84 the contractor shall be subject to a 
special income tax, at a rate of 20% and to a regional tax at a rate of 5% without any 
additional ordinary or extraordinary contribution, duty or other encumbrance of any 
kind, in favour of the state or any other third party. Income tax shall be imposed 
separately on the contractor’s income deriving from each of the agreements 
concluded by it. In case the contractor is a joint venture, the income tax will be 
calculated and imposed separately for each participating member. 
Although Greece has been out of the oil market in the fields of exploration and 
production, with the implementation of the energy reforms and the establishment of 
an investment friendly legal regime is able to promote market competition and ensure 
                                                 
83 HHRM, (2018), http://www.greekhydrocarbons.gr/index.php/legal-fiscal-
terms/hseq/itemlist/category/14-legal-fiscal-terms accessed in 17/1/2018. 
84 Article 8(1) of L. 2289/1995 as amended by Article 161(1) of L. 4001/2011. 
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the participation of reliable oil companies in the development of upstream oil 
activities. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
U.K. even though is still considered a net importer of crude oil, it has a long 
history of oil and gas production and still remains one of the largest oil producers 
having onshore production since 193085 and much more large-scale offshore oil 
production. 
Almost all U.K. oil is produced in the North Sea area of the UK Continental Shelf 
(UKCS) even though it is now considered as a mature basin since the reserves are 
becoming progressively depleted and all the major discoveries have now been made. 
Due to this fact U.K.’s government objective is to ensure that no economically 
developable hydrocarbons are left stranded and to maximize the economic recovery of 
petroleum from UKCS (MER UK strategy). 
Regulatory regime 
The law governing the development of hydrocarbons in the U.K. is the 
Petroleum Act 1998 which vests ownership of the United Kingdom’s petroleum 
resources in the Crown and has granted regulatory responsibility in general for oil and 
gas industry to the Secretary of State for the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC). The Petroleum Act 1998 is supplemented by the Infrastructure Act 
2015, by the newly Energy Act 2016 and various environmental and health and safety 
legislative provisions. A number of changes have been introduced by the Energy Act 
2016, with the most significant the creation and establishment of a new independent 
regulator- the OGA (Oil and Gas Authority)86.  
OGA87 has inherited the licensing responsibilities from DECC and is the sole 
entity in charge for the granting of licenses for exploration and production of 
petroleum in the territorial waters of U.K. and on the UKCS, but the method of 
                                                 
85 The first onshore license was issued in 1935. (Tordo et al, op. cit., p. 63.) 
86 Mace P. et al, Oil and Gas regulation in U.K.: Overview, Thompson Reuters Practical Law, 1-10-2017, 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-524-
5349?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 accessed 5/1/2018.  
87 It is a government company with new regulatory powers including the ability to participate in 
meetings with operators. 
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obtaining the license remains similar to the existing one. OGA acts on its own initiative 
to issue non-binding recommendations in relation to relevant disputes between the 
operators and have the power to impose sanctions for breach of petroleum related 
requirements88. 
Exploration and Production Licensing  
The principle distinctions of licenses are between exploration and production 
licenses and between onshore and offshore licenses and particularly there is a 
Seaward Exploration License and a Landward Exploration License89.  
Production licenses are distinguished in Seaward Production Licenses and a 
Landward Production Licenses and cover both exploration and production and run for 
three successive periods or terms (initial term, second term and third term). Each 
period is associated with a particular activity (e.g. the initial term is associated with 
exploration and the third term is associated with production). The license requires 
fulfillment of the relevant work programme before it can proceed from one term to 
the next90.  
Offshore Innovative License replaces several earlier forms of the Seaward 
production license: The traditional production license, the promote license and the 
frontier license91. The Innovative license offers greater flexibility during the initial and 
second terms (which was the main difference between the older license types). An 
applicant for innovative license can propose the durations of the initial and second 
terms. The initial term is now subdivided into up to three phases (phase A, phase B and 
phase C) with the work programme being correspondingly divided. Phase A is a period 
for carrying out geotechnical studies and geophysical data reprocessing, Phase B is a 
period for undertaking seismic surveys and acquiring other geophysical data and phase 
                                                 
88 Oil and Gas Authority, https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/about-us/what-we-do/ accessed 22/1/2018.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Mace, op. cit. 
91 The traditional license had a term length of 4 years for the initial term, 4 years for the second term 
and 18 years for the third term. The promote license was aimed to start-ups and small companies and 
applicants did not have to prove financial and technical capability before the award of the license but 
they had to do so within two years of the start date of the license. The frontier license intended for 
major companies capable of investing in a challenging and difficult environment and had an exploration 
phase of 6-year initial term followed by 6-year second term and an 18-year production period, while for 
the Atlantic margin area had a 9-year initial term (Hunter, op. cit., p. 115-116.)  
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C is the drilling phase. While phases A and B are optional and depend on the 
applicant’s plans, every work programme must have at least Phase C92. 
OGA issuing licenses through competitive licensing rounds every year. Separate 
rounds are held for seaward (offshore) and landward (onshore) licenses, while where 
there are compelling and justified reasons OGA may issue an out-of-round license. 
During a formal licensing round, the OGA invites application for a specific acreage93. A 
company (either by itself or as part of a joint venture) may apply for a specific licensed 
area and OGA in order to award a license is focused not to the highest bidder but on 
the extent of the proposed work programmes and the financial and technical capability 
of the applicant to complete such work programmes. 
The OGA then publishes a summary of successful bidders’ marks and work 
obligations. Once the license is granted the OGA consent is required for the 
progression through the license phases, for carrying out drilling, for the development 
and cessation of production activities94. Each license takes the form of a deed, which 
binds the licensee to observe the conditions of the license. Secondary legislation made 
under the Petroleum Act contains these detailed conditions (model clauses) governing 
issues such as implementation of development plans, working methods, work 
programmes, measurements and the relinquishment of certain proportion of the 
license area95. 
Taxation regime 
The tax regime which applies to exploration for and production of oil in U.K. 
currently comprises three elements: i) Petroleum revenue tax (PRT, now effectively 
abolished), ii) Ring-fence corporation tax (RFCT) and iii) Supplementary charge (SC). 
PRT96 was a field – based tax charged on the profits arising to each participant 
from the production of oil under a license and applied to fields for which development 
consent was given before 16 March 1993.  
                                                 
92 Oil and Gas Authority, op. cit. 
93 The OGA operates an e-license administration system (the Petroleum E-Licensing Assignments and 
Relinquishments System (PEARS) for the submission of license assignment applications for offshore 
production licenses. 
94 Strong, op. cit., p. 297. 
95 Picton, op. cit., p. 30. 
96 PRT levied at a rate 0% from 1 January 2016 and is charged on a field-by-field basis rather than an 
entity-by-entity basis. In EY, Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide 2017. Available from: 
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RFCT is a modification mechanism of corporation tax that oil companies, like all 
other companies, are subject by way of a “ring-fence97”. The current main rate of tax 
on ring-fence profits is 30%, despite the continuing cut in the main rate of corporation 
tax98. 
SC constitutes an additional charge on ring-fenced profits without any 
deduction for financing costs and its current rate is 10%.  
United Kingdom passes a critical period of its history due to the decision to 
leave the European Union and is in the procedure to set out the post-Brexit life in 
many sectors. Thereby, it is extremely reasonable to be considered that with time the 
relevant energy regulatory regime may be amended. However, there is no indication 
that Brexit will have an immediate impact on the upstream oil industry in the short 
term, since much of the oil regulation governing oil operation is of U.K. origin and it 
seems that there will be no political will to repeal laws based on EU legislation that 
have already been implemented into domestic law99. 
FRANCE 
Oil is a very important energy source in France, constituting the 45% of the 
French energy balance. However, despite the fact that France is a net crude oil 
importer, because there is no substantial national production, the government 
recently took the decision to pass a legislation in order to stop issuing new oil and gas 
exploration and production licenses on its mainland and overseas territories by 
2040100. The extension of current concessions will be gradually limited until they are 
phased out. However, the decision is not going to affect oil upstream sector largely, 
since the amount of France’s domestic production is only equivalent to 1,5 % of its 
total demand. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-oil-and-gas-tax-pdf/$File/ey-oil-and-gas-tax-pdf.pdf, 
accessed 26/12/2017. 
97 The ring fence prevents taxable profits from oil and gas extraction in U.K. and UKCS being reduced by 
losses from other activities or by excessive interest payments.    
98 Oil and Gas Authority, op. cit. 
99 Strong, op. cit., p. 306. 
100 Felix B. /Mallet B., France plans to end oil and gas production by 2040, 6 September 2017, Reuters, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-hydrocarbons/france-plans-to-end-oil-and-gas-production-
by-2040-idUSKCN1BH1AQ accessed 19/1/2018.    
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Regulatory Regime 
The New Mining Code101 (NMC) and the Energy Code102 constitute the main 
legal framework governing the exploration and production oil activities. The Ministry 
for the Ecological and Inclusive Transition is the relevant governmental authority 
responsible for the hydrocarbon sector. The Department of Energy and Climate103 is 
responsible for defining and implementing the French energy policy and within DGEC 
the Hydrocarbons Exploration-Production Bureau manages the French mining 
(hydrocarbon) sector and is responsible to award and renew the exploration and 
production licenses. Disputes related to the mining sector are settled before the 
French administrative and civil courts. The Prefects (“Prefets”) are representative of 
the state responsible for examining research operations, authorizations and 
applications. 
Exploration and Production licensing 
The right to oil and gas are publicly owned and the exploitation of oil resources 
can be performed directly by the state or through a privately operated concession104. 
The NMC identifies three exploration regimes: i) depending on whether the 
owner of the surface area in question is conducting or consented to the exploration 
works following a declaration to the competent administrative authority, ii) the 
competent administration authorized the exploration works to be carried out without 
the landowner’s consent, once the landowner has been formally invited to present his 
observations or iii) exploration works are carried by the holder of an issued exclusive 
exploration license105.  
The landowner prospecting its own property is a consequence of his right of 
ownership and a normal use of this right. However, if his land is within the scope of a 
                                                 
101 Order No. 2011-91, in the First book. 
102 Order No. 2011-504 Book VI and regulatory section codified by Decree No. 2015-1823, in Lauriol T. 
and Guyot C., France: Oil and Gas Regulation 2017, International Comparative Legal Studies, Published 
4/01/2017, https://iclg.com/practice-areas/oil-and-gas-regulation/oil-and-gas-regulation-2017/france 
accessed 26/1/2018.  
103 In French (DGEC). 
104 Guenaire M. et al, Oil and Gas regulation in France: Overview, Practical Law Country, Q&A, 4-629-
7328 (2017), published 1-10-2017, 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/Idc545f8a33db11e698dc8b09b4f043e0/View/F
ullText.html?transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&navId=D9C073AF85F0B1512
A171C78E68CD445&comp=pluk accessed 10/1/2018. 
105 Ibid. 
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concession, of an exploitation permit or an exclusive exploration permit then the 
landowner is not allowed to carry out prospective works any more.  
The authorization from the competent administrative authority, in the absence 
of the landowner’s consent allows the operator to occupy the land and proceed with 
the prospection works by sending request to the Prefects, which after examining the 
request and with the decision of the Minister of Μines by way of an order, with the 
obligation to pay indemnities to the landowner in consideration of the nuisance 
resulting from the activities. This authorization does not grant the prospector any 
exclusivity on the land, as two prospectors may conduct exploration works on the 
same land. In practice exploration works are rarely conducted under such regime and 
are usually undertaken either with the landowner’s consent or under an exclusive 
operation permit. 
The holder of an H106 permit is vested with an exclusive right to undertake 
exploration works within the area defined in the permit and may freely dispose the 
products that might be extracted as a result of such exploration activities107. An H 
permit is granted for a maximum initial five-year period, after a competitive bidding 
process. It may be renewed twice for an additional minimum three-year period and a 
maximum five-year period, without being subject to a competitive procedure, but 
subject to the permit holder’s compliance with its obligations108.  
Oil reserves may only be developed under a concession granted by decree of 
the Council of State following a public enquiry and a bidding process if the developer 
has sufficient financial and technical capacities. The process of obtaining a mining 
concession is largely similar to the one described regarding the exclusive exploration 
license.  
According to the NMC only the holder of an exclusive research permit in force 
may obtain a concession within the acreage and for the substances mentioned by the 
permit. In addition the holder of an exclusive research permit has the right, if the 
request is made before the expiry of the permit, to the granting of concessions over 
                                                 
106 An H permit is granted after an application to the Ministers for the Economy and the Environment. 
The application must contain documents identifying the applicant, a technical report, the contemplated 
work programme, a minimum financial commitment that the applicant is prepared to invest in the 
concession, cartographic documents and impact assessment. 
107 Strong, op. cit., p. 81. 
108 Ibid, p. 79. 
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the deposits that have been discovered and may be exploited during the period of the 
validity of the aforesaid permit109. The concession is granted for a maximum 50-year 
period and may be extended for additional periods of time that may not exceed 25 
years each110.  
Taxation regime 
The holders of the concessions are bound to pay on an annual basis, a royalty 
payment to the state at a progressive rate and calculated on the production. The rates 
for the royalty payment for oil and gas developments differentiate between former 
and new productions. Former productions include all wells in operation before 1 
January 1980, through traditional means of production. Any other production is 
deemed a new production111.  
In addition to the royalty regime operators are subject to corporate income tax 
due on French-source taxable profits at the rate of 33,3%. There are several other 
taxes that must be paid, such as a social surtax, consumption tax on petroleum 
products and VAT on oil products, however there are no royalties on offshore 
production112. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109Ibid. 
110 Article L. 132-11 of the NMC. 
111 Concerning the crude oil, the rate for less than 50,000 tons per tranche of annual production, 
amounts to 8% for former production and 0% for new productions. For 50,000 tons to 100,000 tons per 
tranche of annual production, amounts to 20% for former production and 6% for new productions. For 
100,000 tons to 300,000 tons per tranche of annual production amounts to 30% for former production 
and 9% for new productions. For more than 300,000 tons per tranche of annual production amounts to 
30% for former production and 12% for new productions. In Lauriol, op. cit. 
112 Borgia D., Oil regulation in 33 jurisdictions worldwide, contributing editor: Bob Palmer, Getting the 
deal through, Law Business Research Ltd., (2014), U.K., p. 69. Available from: 
http://s535048652.onlinehome.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Cameroon2014-PRINTED.pdf, accessed 
12/1/2018. 
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Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) issues 
Exploration and production oil activities are considered as dangerous and 
polluting industry sector since involves the processing of high flammable and explosive 
materials, affecting and putting at risk the environment and the persons carrying out 
or involved in these activities. The main risks are associated with oil well eruption at 
the drilling or production site, the rupture of a pipeline and the subsequent massive 
release of oil into the environment, the disposal of waste products generated in the 
course of the petroleum operations, especially during the decommissioning of 
production installations at the end of production life of an oil field113.  Other types of 
risks are the temporary or permanent occupation of a portion of the land or sea 
surface or the sea bottom required for drilling locations, for the installation and 
building of offshore oil facilities. In the oil industry one of the key safety challenges 
regarding the equipment and installations is asset integrity in terms of whether the 
offshore installations for example continue to operate beyond their design life.  
 
Some oil production operations have resulted in serious accidents with the 
consequences and externalities occurring at regional, local, national and international 
levels and most of the times have been catastrophic in term of casualties, 
environmental pollution, lost of investment and depending on the circumstances 
company’s reputation damage. In general there is the impression that the 
environmental concerns get significantly greater attention in oil contracts than 
concerns relating to health, safety and social impacts114. However, HSE risks have 
always been important to the oil industry, which works to improve safety in the 
workplace through ongoing research, standards development, training and sharing of 
recommended practices usually committed not only to the safety and health of its 
employees and contractors but also to the communities they operate.  
                                                 
113 Taverne, op. cit., p. 12.   
114 Social impacts as a notion may include increases in the price of local products and services since the 
commencement of E&P operations in certain area, immigration into the project area causing several 
problems that should be resolved, resettlement and compensation and potential human rights 
implications to indigenous peoples.  
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HSE Regulation 
There are several provisions in petroleum contracts dealing explicitly with HSE 
issues which if properly executed and when taking all the reasonable precautionary 
measures, then the operation of petroleum facilities onshore and offshore does not 
present a danger for human health, safety and the environment in general. Indicatively 
there are terms to ensure that when harm occurs, oil companies take responsibility for 
such harm and are able to meet the costs of mitigating it, including requirements for 
insurance and allocating liability. In an oil contract is also common to find a provision 
to ensure that at the end of oil operations the environment is so far as possible, 
returned to the state it was in before the oil operations started (decommissioning 
phase). In the case the petroleum contracts do not contain such explicitly provisions 
definitely a reference to national laws and regulations (planning, environmental), 
international laws and conventions or to international standards and “good oilfield 
practice” is incorporated providing substantial protection. 
HSE issues are regulated by the national laws and the competent authorities. 
Therefore, oil companies before they commence of any exploration or production 
activity must perform a thorough assessment of the national statutory requirements 
regarding HSE issues in the countries in which they operate. It is conceded that there 
are differences between the legal regimes applied with one of the differences between 
safety and health governance schemes to be related as to whether countries have 
prescriptive or performance-based approaches to regulation. In the prescriptive 
regime the regulator is responsible for ensuring that operators meet clearly defined 
requirements (used in U.S.A.) whereas in the performance-based regime the operators 
have greater responsibility and are encouraged to innovate (used in Norway)115.    
Differences also exist in the legal and regulatory system regarding HSE issues 
between developing and developed countries as host countries. Developing countries 
have different levels of laws, environmental awareness and politics and may accept 
less stringent HSE standards in exchange for more revenues. However, the last years 
                                                 
115 International Labour Organization (ILO), Occupational safety and health and skills in the oil and gas 
industry operating in polar and subarctic climate zones of the northern hemisphere, sectoral policies 
department, ILO Geneva, 2015, p. 15,  
http://www.ilo.org/sector/Resources/publications/WCMS_438074/lang--en/index.htm accessed 
20/1/2018. 
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particularly regarding environmental issues, it can be said that laws requiring 
environmental insurance, oil spill response capability, environmental audits and 
decommissioning funds are also becoming common in the legislation of the vast 
majority of the producing countries. Devices used in many developed countries such as 
suspension or cancellation of licenses, fines and criminal penalties, environmental 
charges and taxes are spread globally116.  
Within European Union for example, all Member States must incorporate into 
their national laws and implement all the Directives regarding the energy sector and 
the environmental protection.  
Environmental legislation falls into a number of different categories divided 
into anticipatory and continuing controls. Anticipatory controls relate to the planning 
and consent stage of most operations in order to prevent or mitigate any 
environmental impact, whereas the continuing controls relate to the operational 
phase and controls whether the activity is carried on properly or not117.  Therefore, 
under the contractual terms or the legislation the IOC may be required to include 
description of the project, the applicable legislation, prediction of possible risks and 
impacts the project might have on the environmental and social situation. Further, 
environmental audits, an anti-pollution plan which include an analysis of the sensitivity 
of the local environment, monitoring programme and consideration of alternatives and 
mitigation measures or management actions to offset the potential risks, should be 
reported in an impact assessment. 
It is clear then that it is on the side of the host country, in which the oil 
company is operating, to dispose the means in order to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the legislation. 
Best Practices and Standards 
In the absence of international law standards, national statutes or contractual 
provisions for HSE issues, many industry trade associations118 and other organizations 
                                                 
116 Smith, op. cit., p. 808. 
117 Park, op. cit., p. 166. 
118 E.g. the American Petroleum Institute (API), International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA), International Oil and Gas Producers Association (OGP). There are also 
several regional and national petroleum associations e.g. Australian Petroleum Production and 
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have developed writing codes of conduct of best practice guidance addressing HSE 
issues (soft law) applicable internationally, which may fill some of the gaps in the 
regulatory mechanisms and are commonly used by judges and arbitrators to 
determine the meaning of “good oilfield practice119”.  
Companies have fully documented and effectively implemented management 
systems and standards for HSE performance. An important mechanism which provides 
recommendations and guidance to the activities related to the oil industry is the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) which provides universal industrial 
standards for the oil industry. A number of core ISO standards exist for use from the oil 
companies, such as ISO 14001 for controlling environmental impact and improving 
environmental performance, ISO 45001 which sets requirements for occupational 
health and safety (OHS) management system and is designed to help companies and 
organizations to ensure the health and safety of workers, ISO 19906 which specifies 
the requirements for the offshore structures regarding the oil and gas activities in 
Arctic and cold regions120. 
The ILO international labour standards provide the minimum legal framework 
and essential tools for governments, employers and workers to establish such 
practices in order to promote OHS and setting forth the principle that workers should 
be protected from sickness, disease and injuries arising from their employment. 
Globalization and technological progress have transformed the oil business and 
nowadays societies expects more from oil companies and particularly demand IOC to 
incorporate HSE issues into the business decision-making process for projects all 
around the world and even in the most sensitive environments such as deep offshore, 
tropical forests or the Arctic tundra. The public largely believe that the oil industry has 
done little if anything to contribute to sustainable economic development in host 
countries in which it operates. However, at present oil industry has to operate on the 
basis of three inseparable imperatives: economic development, social responsibility 
                                                                                                                                               
Exploration Association (APPEA) and regional intergovernmental grouping e.g. African Petroleum 
Producers’ Association (APPA). 
119 Smith, op. cit., p. 812. 
120 Other types of ISO are ISO 31000 which provides standards on risk management, ISO 26000 provides 
guidance on social responsibility, International Labour Organization (ILO), op. cit., p. 18. 
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and environmental protection121. The most apparent change in the HSE management 
is the fact that public interest groups seek, and indeed have, a voice in decision-making 
process through public consultations while at the same time commitments made by 
the oil industry are now published externally. Safety and environmental management 
should be an integral part of the business, if responsible operators aim to be perceived 
by the public as being part of the solution to HSE issues and not the source of the 
problems. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Rouzaut, op. cit., p. 286. 
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Conclusions 
Countries with petroleum resources in their subsoil dispose an energy treasure 
which must be exploited. Their governments hence, have strong incentives to employ 
private companies in cases involving high risks by applying the proper fiscal and 
political manipulations and regulatory framework. The petroleum policy is based on 
certain priorities such as financial viability and efficiency, political consistency and 
social objectives, transparency and accountability, determining the relationship 
between petroleum-producing countries and oil companies.  
Despite the fact that the types of contracts used in the upstream oil industry 
remain the same however, contract terms especially those associated with the fiscal 
regime significantly change in order to attract investments and upgrade the degree of 
competition of the contract area and of the country in general. It could be said, that 
the proper use and application of stabilization clauses improving the fairness of the 
contracts and the procedures awarding E&P rights which are becoming more 
transparent aiming to eliminate any discrimination, provide a regulatory “safety net” 
for future investments. 
It is obvious that negotiating the contractual provisions in the proper contract 
form is critical for governments and the investors so they can optimize the benefits 
deriving by their interaction. Governments’ objective on the one hand is to reap the 
significant benefits from the exploitation of its natural resources aiming to obtain 
capital for social and economic development especially in periods of severe economic 
crisis. The IOC on the other hand have become more selective regarding the 
investments due to budgetary constraints especially in periods when oil prices are low 
thus, their objective is to protect themselves against possible losses and to operate in 
a safe and challenging environment. 
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